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ABSTRACT 
As we age there are significant changes to our brain structure and cognitive 
functioning. There is a substantial body of literature exploring changes to memory 
and attention during healthy adult aging. There has been considerably less focus on 
the impact of aging on other areas of cognition, specifically, decision-making. This is 
surprising given that choices are ubiquitous in daily life across the lifespan. For 
example, older adults still face many significant decisions including those concerning 
finances in light of reduced income and choices about lifestyle factors in response to 
potential healthcare issues. Recently, the research community has increasingly 
shown appreciation of these issues and the literature on changes to decision-making 
function due to healthy aging is beginning to converge on key themes that are 
particularly telling in terms of how aging affects decision-making. The literature has 
focused predominantly on the negative effects of healthy aging on decision-making, 
particularly in terms of risk-processing. However, although fewer in number, some 
studies have identified age-related positive effects commonly attributed to an 
accumulation of ‘wisdom’ by the older adult. This review will provide an overview of 
the negative and positive changes to decision-making as we age and will, uniquely, 
converge these two streams of research and put forward the hypothesis that age-
related changes in decision-making, underpinned by changes to the structure and 
function of the aging brain, underlie both positive and negative changes, the 
manifestation of which depends on choice context. 
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HEALTHY ADULT AGING AND DECISION-MAKING: IS IT ALL DOWNHILL 
FROM HERE? 
 
The stereotypical view of the older adult as one who experiences global 
declines in cognitive and physiological functioning is pervasive. However, 
experimental research has provided evidence that healthy aging is associated with 
an “orchestration” of positive and negative physical and mental changes (Richards & 
Hatch, 2011). Some of these changes are well-documented, for example, consider 
the vast amount of research that has investigated changes in memory and attention 
during healthy aging (these fields are not the focus of this review; for comprehensive 
reviews in these areas, see Cansino, 2007; Nyberg, Lövdén, Riklund, Lindenberger 
& Bäckman, 2012), while other cognitive processes in which age-related changes 
are apparent have been explored to a significantly lesser extent. Age-related change 
in decision-making functioning is one of these lesser explored areas, which is 
surprising given that decision-making is ubiquitous in our everyday lives. There are a 
number of behavioural studies that have investigated age-related changes in some 
of the domains in which decisions are made. Recently, neuroimaging has been used 
to identify the functioning of brain areas associated with decision-making, although 
these articles are few in number. The experimental cognitive approach taken by 
these studies has the power to identify which particular cognitive mechanisms show 
age-related disruption and thus where the attention of those interested in age-related 
changes in decision-making should be directed. For example, when constructing the 
most efficacious decision aids for older adults these should target those areas of 
cognition where there is a strong evidence base for decreased functioning. It is 
therefore important to build upon the research that has already been conducted in 
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order to build a more complete picture of the nature of age-related changes in 
decision-making, a process upon which this review will focus.  
The number of older adults within the population is increasing and this trend is 
forecasted to continue. According to a report from the United Nations on the 
distribution of age ranges worldwide, in 1950 1-in-20 individuals were aged 65 or 
over; in 2000 this ratio had changed to 1-in-14 and by 2050 this ratio is forecasted to 
be 1-in-6 (United Nations Population Division, 2002). This change will be associated 
with increased pressure on older adults to manage their own finances and quality of 
life in addition to maintaining a longer work-life due to lengthier life spans. Given this 
increasing pressure on older adults, retaining a high level of decision-making 
functioning is of extreme importance for the well-being of the older adult in addition 
to society as a whole. It is worthwhile noting that an older adult is defined in this case 
as being over 65 years of age but this definition is not universal. A detailed 
discussion of the boundaries that have been used in the literature is included later in 
this section. 
Research has uncovered that there are age-related declines in cognitive 
functioning (Sternthal & Bonezzi, 2009). These declines lead to real-world 
consequences for the older adult. Financial decision-making is one such area where 
a decline in functioning has been noted (Kasten & Kasten, 2011; Weierich et al., 
2011). In a study investigating investment decisions older adults made on average 3-
5% lower returns than younger adults due to risk aversive choice strategies and the 
spreading of investments over a broader range of options (Korniotis & Kumar, 2009; 
Bellante & Green, 2004). The ability to make financial decisions, defined as a 
maximisation of cost-benefit trade-offs in credit transactions, has been posited to 
follow a U-shaped trend peaking at 53 years of age (Agarwal, Gabaix, Driscoll & 
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Laibson, 2009) although, as will be seen throughout this review, this proposed 
window of peak performance does not hold for all choice domains. Furthermore, 
choices about health-related outcomes (such as treatment plans for health-related 
issues) suffer from age-related declines with older adults choosing relatively less 
optimal outcomes that would result in greater monetary loss and/or a decrease in the 
utility of the option (Boyle et al., 2012).  
Declines in decision-making performance have been linked to processes such 
as degraded processing speed (Löckenhoff, 2011), decreased information sampling 
or an increase in the use of heuristics, or cognitive “shortcuts” (Hanoch, Wood & 
Rice, 2007), or changes in the processing of probability and value (Weller, Levin & 
Denburg, 2011). Another potential contributory factor for less efficacious choice 
behaviour in the aforementioned domain is the tendency for older adults to focus 
more on emotionally positive compared to negative information (Carstensen & 
Mikels, 2005). This “positivity effect” is prevalent within the literature investigating 
decision-making in older adults. The positivity effect is based upon socioemotional 
selectivity theory and posits that as one becomes older, and perception of available 
time becomes bounded, one’s motivation to achieve more subjectively meaningful 
goals, such as creating and maintaining intimate relationships and feelings of 
interconnectedness, increases. This is in comparison to younger adults who perceive 
available time as more expansive and are more motivated to achieve goals that are 
associated with novelty and the acquisition of information (for a review, see 
Carstensen & Mikels, 2005). When making a decision older adults tend to sample 
more positive information compared to negative information while younger adults 
tend to sample from both types (Löckenhoff & Carstensen, 2007). When reporting 
strategies behind information sampling, older adults tend to report strategies that 
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maximise positive emotions while younger adults tend to report strategies that avoid 
negative emotions (Chen & Ma, 2009). This loss-avoiding decision approach means 
that losses are not fully integrated into decision frameworks and thus, when losses 
are critical considerations, decision-making performance suffers (Chen & Ma, 2009). 
The positivity effect has complex effects upon decision-making which will be returned 
to throughout this review. 
Changes to cognitive processes as detailed in the previous paragraph have 
been associated with age-related reductions in brain mass (Good et al., 2001; Raz et 
al., 2005; Resnick, Pham, Kraut, Zonderman & Davitzikos, 2003). Many of the brain 
areas commonly associated with decision-making are those most severely affected 
by age-related neural atrophy, notably lateral frontal and parietal areas in addition to 
subcortical regions, which results in reduced functioning within these areas as 
described by the frontal hypothesis (Dempster, 1992; West, 1996), HAROLD model 
(Cabeza, 2002)  and dopamine hypothesis of cognitive aging (Braver & Barch, 
2002). It is therefore unsurprising that neurobiological changes associated with 
healthy aging have been associated with age-related changes in decision-making 
strategies, and thus investigation of how healthy age-related neurobiological 
changes are associated with declining decision-making function are of value for their 
ability to elucidate causal factors of sub-optimal behaviour. 
When considering the research investigating age-related effects on decision-
making, it is important to consider the samples being studied. Terms such as “older 
adult” are broad and open to different interpretations. Some studies have defined 
their older group as being over 50 years of age while others have provided samples 
with a minimum age of approximately 65. Although testing of such ages within the 
definition of “older adults” may appear valid, comparison may be fraught with 
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confounds. The difference in lifestyle between a 55 year old and 65 year old may be 
markedly different, for example, one may be in full-time employment whereas the 
other may not. There may also be different societal influences given the differences 
in the time period in which they grew up (this potential issue applies when comparing 
performance across any age range). Work is now beginning to emerge in which 
different cohorts are defined more clearly, for example, the definition of the “oldest-
old” as those of 85 years of age and above (of which we know very little in terms of 
decision-making functioning) helps by providing some clear age boundaries. One 
must also take into account other differences between younger and older groups in 
any study which performs contrasts between them. There are studies in which 
younger adults are university students but older adults are from a community 
sample, thus we are arguably testing a group of high-functioning younger individuals 
with a broader range of community dwellers. Furthermore, in some studies the older 
adults are (at the time of testing) university academics, thus may not be 
representative of the wider older adult population. Care must be taken in future 
studies to maintain a balance between comparative groups for inferences to be 
made that are not contaminated by such confounds. In order to aid the reader in 
helping them determine the possible effects of such confounds within the literature, 
where single studies are used to provide inferences the mean ages, standard 
deviations/range of scores and source of the groups (US = university sample, CD = 
Community dwellers) will be provided wherever possible. 
This review will explore empirical findings as to the functioning of decision-
making capability in older adults. Firstly, domains in which decision-making 
functioning seems to increase, or be maintained, will be described and, following 
this, areas in which marked declines in decision-making quality are evident will be 
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covered. This review will maintain a focus on cognitive and emotional processes that 
underlie the changes in decision-making functioning with the aim of identifying 
common themes within the emerging literature thus providing targets for future basic 
and applied work. 
 
It’s not all bad: Age-related positive associations with decision-making 
functioning 
 
It is of great importance to not only find valid empirical evidence for age-
related declines in decision-making ability but to also highlight those domains in 
which there are age-related increases in, or maintenance of, functioning. Identifying 
these domains will greatly aid in designing environments in which older decision-
makers can make decisions of greater utility or compensate for declines in decision-
making functioning.  
A key theme that will be put forward throughout this review is that the same 
cognitive and emotional mechanisms that underlie negative age-related effects on 
decision-making also underlie positive effects. Furthermore, it will also be put 
forward that these positive and negative changes are associated with changes within 
the same brain regions within the neural system for decision-making. The positivity 
effect (as described above) has been linked to decreased optimality of choice 
behaviour in some domains if in those domains consideration of losses is important. 
However, as we will soon see, the positivity effect also provides a resistance against 
some well-known choice fallacies.  
Although many cognitive skills decline with age, older adults make better 
decisions, compared to younger adults, in many choices of which they are familiar, 
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and thus within which they have acquired wisdom. In a task in which older (M = 68.2 
years, SD = 6.8 years, CD) and younger (M = 20.8 years, SD = 5.3 years, US) 
individuals had to choose between a certain payout and a risky payout (of which the 
contingencies of the latter had to be learnt through repeated sampling), older adults 
showed similar levels of adaptive decision-making to younger adults despite older 
adults sampling less information about the risky option (Spaniol and Wegier, 2012). 
Reduced sampling by older vs. younger adults has been measured across many 
decision-making domains (for a review, see Mata and Nunes, 2010). The dopamine 
hypothesis of cognitive aging (e.g. Li, Lindenberger & Silk, 2001) posits that 
degradation in ascending dopaminergic function leads to “neural noise” within 
dopaminergic signalling within ventral striatal and ventromedial prefrontal regions. 
Dopaminergic activity within these regions has been associated with several 
decision-making processes including reward processing (Delgado, 2007), motivation 
and approach-avoidance (McClure, Daw & Montague, 2003), coding of risk and 
uncertainty (Fiorillo, Tobler & Schultz, 2003) and stimulus-response learning 
(Delgado, Li, Schiller & Phelps, 2008). Age-related degradation in dopaminergic 
functioning should be associated with decreases in the performance of all these 
processes and can explain reduced sampling; however, in this instance, despite 
decreased motivation to sample, decision-making performance was seemingly not 
affected. Further work to explore the reasons behind such an apparent discrepancy 
is required; however, it may be that older adults may have been using a “tried-and-
tested” strategy based upon their increased practice in making decisions that 
masked any degradation in neural functioning. 
Older adults also seem not to be as affected by irrelevant distracters when 
making decisions. The decoy effect is a phenomenon in which inserting an irrelevant 
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option within a choice (i.e. one that would never be chosen) causes a reversal in the 
choice made, typically ending with the chooser preferring the option that provides 
lesser utility. Older (60-89 years, CD) and younger (17-27 years, US) individuals 
indicated a preference between three activities offering varying amounts of course 
credit that took differing amounts of time to complete or between three store discount 
cards that varied in the level of discount and minimum purchase required to acquire 
the discount (Kim and Hasher, 2005). Younger adults were affected by the decoy 
when making choices about discount cards, but not when choosing between 
activities for course credit. In contrast, across both domains, older adults’ decisions 
were typically not affected by decoys (Kim and Hasher, 2005). Younger individuals 
reported as much knowledge about discount cards and course credit whereas older 
adults expressed greater knowledge about discount cards compared to course 
credits; therefore, domain-specific knowledge was posited not to be the reason 
behind the discrepancy in choice regularity. However, younger adults expressed an 
interest in course credit but not discount cards whereas older adults expressed 
interest in both, thus tentatively suggesting that engagement in the choice may be an 
underlying factor in resistance to the decoy effect. However, it is worth noting that 
the decoy always offered an equal discount or credit value to one of the other 
choices but involved spending drastically more time or spending more money. 
Therefore, it has been suggested that older adults may be more resistant to 
excessive spending in terms of money and effort (Tentori, Osherson, Hasher and 
May, 2001), thus the decoy is immediately ignored as it is over a threshold defined 
by one’s own financial/mental/physical “budget”. One other explanation is that due to 
reduced dopaminergic functioning older adults sample less, thus resistance to the 
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decoy effect may occur due to heavy discounting of the decoy as only the most 
subjectively important options are included in the set of options being considered. 
In addition to the decoy effect, older adults are more resistant to another well-
known bias within decision-making, the sunk-cost fallacy. The sunk-cost fallacy 
occurs when the chooser, instead of cutting their losses, selects to continue to invest 
in a course of action in which a prior investment has been made, e.g. the tendency to 
continue to watch a boring movie you have paid to see compared to one that was 
free. Older adults’ resistance to the sunk-cost effect has been found in several 
studies and thus this finding seems reliable (Strough, Mehta, McFall and Schuller, 
2008; Strough, Karns and Schlosnagle, 2011; Strough, Shlosnagle and Didonato, 
2011). This resistance has been attributed to the positivity effect whereby the prior 
investment (which can be classified as a loss as it involved a loss of money, effort, 
etc.) is heavily discounted with the decision-making framework and therefore does 
not impinge upon the older adult’s drive to acquire positive outcomes, an optimal 
solution in this case. It is also worth noting that in older and younger adults that do 
fall foul of the sunk-cost effect, simple decision aids (such as instructions to “thing 
like a scientist”) reduce levels of the bias equally across both age ranges (Thomas & 
Millar, 2012) tentatively suggesting that degradations in decision-making quality in 
older adults may be easily reversible with simple interventions. Thus, it may be the 
case that degradations in decision-making functioning are not lost, but that 
compensation for them demands cued higher-order processes to override non-
optimal (semi-) automatic decisions strategies. However, significantly more research 
is required using various decisions aids in a wide range of choice environments to 
produce more substantial validation of this hypothesis. 
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Given the evidence for age-related decreases in cognitive ability it would 
seem sensible that choice scenarios containing multiple options each with several 
attributes would pose a problem for older decision-makers. However, emerging 
evidence suggests that, in certain cases, this may not be the case. Even when 
choice complexity is increased by enlarging the number of attributes and choices, 
older adults (65-84 years, CD), middle-aged (45-64 years, CD) and younger (25-44 
years, CD) adults tend to adapt their decision-making strategies in the same manner 
(Queen, Hess, Ennis, Dowd and Grühn, 2012) although this is not universal (Wood 
et al., 2011) which will be discussed in the next section on age-related negative 
effects on decision-making. Given the evidence so far for reduced sampling in older 
adults (Johnson, 1990) this result at first appears incongruous. However, older adults 
have been found to be as adaptive as younger adults when it comes to adjusting 
information-search strategies (Hess, Queen & Ennis, 2013; Mata, Schooler and 
Rieskamp, 2007). In addition, these types of tasks (e.g. purchasing an automobile) 
provide more realistic simulations of everyday choices as opposed to lab-specific 
scenarios. Older adults have been found to perform better than younger adults on 
decision-making tasks that more accurately represent real-life events (Worthy, 
Gorlick, Pacheco, Schnyer and Maddox, 2011; Worthy and Maddox, 2012). Older 
adults have been found to select more highly-rewarding options when choices that 
they make impact upon subsequent choices (choice-dependent task) and optimal 
performance depends on an efficacious learning strategy (as would happen in real-
life) rather than in “one-shot” situations where all choices are independent (choice-
independent). In contrast, younger adults show the opposite pattern (Worthy, 
Gorlick, Pacheco, Schnyer and Maddox, 2011; Worthy and Maddox, 2012).  
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The difference in choice behaviour between older and younger adults 
witnessed in this task has been posited to be due to the heuristic used to determine 
choice strategy. Older adults have been found to prefer a simpler win-stay-lose-shift 
(WSLS) heuristic where choice only shifts to an alternative option if the selected 
option proffers a loss; if the option pays out a win then choice remains on the 
previously selected option (e.g. Frank and Kong, 2008). Younger adults tended to 
utilise a reinforcement-learning (RL) approach. The RL approach is algorithmic (i.e. 
non-heuristic) and based upon calculation and comparison of expected reward 
values of each outcome. The WSLS and RL models each offer the better strategy in 
the choice-independent and choice-dependent tasks respectively. Thus, in this 
instance, the favouring of the simpler heuristic by the older adults, which is likely due 
to decreased cognitive resources underpinned by decreases in neural function, 
actually works in favour for the older adult. However, in tasks that require learning in 
which a WSLS strategy is not appropriate, older adults’ performance is typically 
worse compared to that of young adults (this will be covered in the next section). 
Furthermore, if the individual is faced with social pressure to perform well (i.e. 
winnings for the participant and that of another depends solely on the participant’s 
making gainful decisions), older adult’s performance (average age 67.4 years, CS) 
decreases below that of younger adults’ (average age 20.65 years, US) which has 
been attributed to the unavailability of additional frontal resources in the brain within 
older adults to compensate for the additional cognitive load caused by the social 
pressure (Cooper, Worthy, Gorlick & Maddox, 2013). Findings such as these have 
wide applicability to real-world decisions in which decisions are inextricably linked 
with varying levels of stress. Further work exploring the effects of stress or similar 
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events that increase cognitive load is needed in order to permit a greater 
understanding into this important area of research. 
To summarise, it is known that there are age-related declines in neural and 
cognitive processing. These declines affect the quality of decision-making in older 
adults. However, there is enough evidence to posit that the same mechanisms that 
underlie negative effects on decision-making (which we will move onto in the next 
section) also underlie many positive changes, but only in certain domains. Further 
work needs to occur based upon the theory posited herein which further explores 
domains in which older adults become more proficient decision-makers. This would 
have a multitude of applications such as framing decision-making scenarios (such as 
choices involving healthcare or financial outcomes) such that older adults can use 
their decision-making abilities fully. 
 
The ‘downside’: Age-related negative associations with decision-making 
functioning 
 
Although, as can be seen in the previous section, there has been some 
research into age-related positive effects on decision-making, the majority of the 
literature has explored negative effects. There are themes emerging that have 
identified certain domains in which healthy older adults choose outcomes with poorer 
utility compared to younger adults. This section will review the literature on age-
related negative effects on decision-making and identify the emerging themes. 
Dual-process theorists propose that any instances of choice in our everyday 
lives involve the use of deliberative strategies or an affective approach in which we 
use our “gut feelings” (for a review see Evans, 2008). Reliable evidence indicates 
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that when the optimal solution is to use an affective strategy, older adults’ decision-
making performance is similar to that of younger adults. In contrast, when a 
deliberative strategy is optimal, younger adults make considerably better decisions 
(typically measured in terms of financial gain) than older adults (Hess, Queen & 
Patterson, 2012; Huang, Wood, Berger & Hanoch, 2013; Mikels, Cheung, Cone & 
Gilovich, 2013; Queen & Hess, 2010). Age-related degradation in performance when 
utilising the latter type of decision strategies has been linked to the progressive 
atrophy during healthy aging of cortical brain regions involved in deliberative, 
cognitive, processing (Braver & West, 2008). Older adults’ decision times are 
significantly longer than those measured in younger adults (for a review, see 
Löckenhoff, 2011) which, at first glance, could be viewed as a compensatory method 
for degradation in deliberative ability. Adults over 70 years of age show decision 
speeds approximately 1.5 times longer than individuals in their twenties (Myerson, 
Robertson & Hale, 2007). However, given the reliable findings showing age-related 
degradation in deliberative processing, this suggests a general slowing of decision-
making function rather than a compensatory method. 
One area which has received a relatively greater amount of attention has 
been in decisions involving risk. Within this area domain-specific age-related 
changes have reliably been observed. In tasks in which a risk-averse strategy is the 
optimal course older adults tend to be more risk-seeking than younger adults leading 
to decreased gains (Heninger, Madden and Huettel, 2010; Zamarian, Sinz, Bonatti, 
Gamboz and Delazer, 2008). Almost entirely, this understanding comes from use of 
the Iowa gambling task, or IGT (Bechara, Damasio, Damasio & Anderson, 1994). In 
the IGT participants are tasked with making as much (hypothetical) money as they 
can. They are faced with four decks of cards of which the cards are face down so 
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have to be flipped over to be read. Each card carries a monetary reward and, 
potentially, a monetary punishment. Two decks provide high magnitudes of reward 
but are constructed so that they will eventually lead to an overall loss. In contrast the 
remaining two decks offer smaller rewards but are constructed in a way that they will 
lead to an overall gain. Thus, the participant must, over multiple choices, learn the 
contingencies of the decks and inhibit impulsive drives to pick the cards with the 
higher rewards, instead, opting to play the “long game”. There are several studies 
indicating that older adults perform significantly worse than younger adults on the 
IGT (Bauer et al., 2013; Denburg, Tranel & Bechara, 2005; Denburg et al., 2009; 
Fein, McGillivray & Finn, 2007; Isella et al., 2008; Lamar & Resnick, 2004; Mohr, Li & 
Heekeren, 2010; Zamarian, Sinz, Bonatti, Gamboz & Delazer, 2008). This appears 
to contrast with previous work suggesting that older adults employ useful heuristics 
(i.e. win-stay lose-shift) when faced with tasks that require learning of contingencies 
(Worthy et al. 2011; Worthy and Maddox, 2012). However, as opposed to these 
tasks, use of the WSLS strategy in the IGT would lead the individual to maintain 
choice on higher-rewarding decks, thus leading to significant loss.  
Performance degradation in the IGT does not occur in all older adults 
(Denburg et al., 2005; Wood, Busemeyer, Koling, Cox & Davis, 2005); however, it is 
more common to generally find age-related decreases in performance. Degradation 
in IGT performance has been attributed to decreased executive functioning and 
memory functioning (Brand and Schriebener, 2013; Denburg et al., 2005; Fein et al., 
2007; Isella et al., 2008) which is associated with impaired learning ability leading to 
a predominantly reward-focused strategy as the immediate impact of the rewards is 
more salient than future outcomes. Neurobiological underpinnings for this reward-
driven focus in older adults have been provided. Neural activity in the striatum, an 
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area involved in the indexing of subjective value of rewards, is equal in older and 
younger subjects when anticipating a monetary reward. In contrast, when 
anticipating a loss, older adults express significantly less activity in this area 
compared to younger individuals suggesting that losses are integrated into decision-
making strategies to a much lesser extent in older compare to younger individuals 
(Samanez-Larkin et al., 2007), thus susceptibility to acquiring an overall loss in the 
IGT is due to decreased integration of the potential punishments into current 
decision frameworks. Such age-related changes may also underlie the positivity 
effect as it appears that losses are less involved in decision strategies at a biological 
level.  
There is some debate as to whether such age-related performance 
degradations are approximately linear. IGT performance has been found to begin 
decreasing after (approximately) 35 years of age (Fein et al., 2007) while, in 
contrast, middle-aged individuals (40-59 years) have been found to perform in a 
similar way to younger individuals (20-38 years) but both significantly better than 
older (61-80 years) adults (MacPherson, Phillips & Della Salla, 2002). The age at 
which cognitive decline begins has been associated with a great deal of debate 
(Park et al., 2002; Salthouse, 1996). With this in mind, the general timeline for age-
related degradation in decision-making functioning needs to be made clear so that it 
is known at which age groups particular attention, and use of decision aids, should 
be targeted. 
When the task calls for a risk-seeking strategy older adults tend to perform as 
well as younger adults (Dror, Katona and Mangur, 1998; Mather et al., 2012; 
Westbrook, Martins, Yarkoni and Braver, 2012) although it is important to note that 
within the literature the tasks in which risk-seeking was the appropriate strategy have 
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also provided well-defined risks, the opposite of which was true for the tasks calling 
for a risk-averse strategy. When faced with choices involving risk, older adults have 
reliably been shown to perform at an equal level to younger adults if the risks are 
well-defined but express comparatively poorer performance when faced with ill-
defined risks (for a recent meta-analysis see Mata, Josef, Samanez-Larkin and 
Hetwig, 2011). This has been related to age-related functional decline of fluid 
intelligence (the ability to reason) linked to age-related cortical atrophy. However, 
tasks involving well-defined risks in which decisions do not rely on fluid intelligence, 
instead relying on crystallised intelligence (knowledge of previously encoded 
knowledge and skills), do not suffer (Bruine de Bruin, Parker and Fischhoff, 2012; Li, 
Baldassi, Johnson & Weber, 2013). Further work needs to be carried out to pull apart 
the effects of risk definition and risk strategy to come to a conclusion as to how age 
is related to changes in strategy involving decisions under risk. This will impact upon 
a multitude of real-world domains, e.g. older adults’ strategy towards financial risk or 
risks linked to healthcare. 
The decision tasks described so far within this section have focused on lab 
tasks designed to measure particular sub-processes within everyday decision-
making. Choices in our day-to-day lives are typically more complex. Multi-attribute 
choice tasks have been used in order to gather data about decision-making 
performance in situations that more closely mimic the complexity of particular 
everyday decisions, such as shopping. Such tasks involve the participant choosing 
one of several items that vary in quality on several attributes, for example, one may 
be creating a preference from a list of 5 types of coffee based on 5 attributes, such 
as strength, price, popularity and so forth. There has been much interest in age-
related changes in performance in multi-attribute tasks given that such choices 
19 
 
 
 
feature heavily in our lives and some forms have enormous implications for 
ourselves and others, e.g. selecting a treatment option from several available. Given 
that they are designed to mimic certain everyday choice scenarios, that older adults 
have greater experience in such environments than younger adults, and that tasks 
that engage older individuals tend not to be associated with decreases in decision-
making performance (Castel, 2005), it could be reasonable to hypothesise that age-
related degradation in decision quality may not appear in these tasks, especially in 
light of the findings of Queen et al. (2012) in which older adults were found to be as 
adaptive in their decision-making strategies as younger adults; however, this seems 
not to be the case universally. 
There has been particular interest in age-related changes in a type of multi-
attribute task, namely that of choosing between healthcare plans. There is commonly 
an abundance of such plans available and selecting an appropriate plan can be a 
significantly important choice. Given health-related issues within the older 
population, exploring how these individuals choose suitable plans for themselves is, 
understandably, deserving of attention. Older adults have been reliably found to be 
at greater risk of selecting a non-optimal solution for their particular needs compared 
to younger individuals (Finucane et al., 2002; Finucane & Gullion, 2010) and older 
adults tend to show more comprehension errors and express more inconsistent 
preferences across different frames (Finucane et al., 2002); therefore, it is important 
to explore decision-making function in choice domains pertinent to the older 
population, such as choosing between healthcare plans, as individual choices can 
have significant influence on the individual’s and others’ wellbeing. 
In the U.S., a particular change in policy attracted attention in relation to this 
field of decision-making, namely the Medicare Modernisation Act of 2003, also 
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known as Medicare Part D. Medicare Part D permits older adults to obtain subsidies 
on their medical prescriptions. The number of alternatives is typically large with an 
average number of 35 options across US states (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2014). 
Given the number of alternatives combined with differences between plans in the 
types of drugs included, the formulary of the drug included within the plan and the 
associated premiums, the choice is complex. It has been found that when faced with 
these types of choices, older adults more often select sub-optimal plans, or even opt-
out altogether, compared to younger adults (Hanoch, Wood, Barnes, Liu & Rice, 
2011; Szrek & Bundorf, 2011; Wood et al., 2011). Typical experimental studies 
provide less than ten alternatives; however notable age-related effects have been 
found even with this lesser amount of alternatives compared to the full Medicare Part 
D. Notably, increasing the set of alternatives has a greater negative impact on 
decision-quality in older adults vs. younger adults (Wood et al., 2011). The effect of 
increasing the number of alternatives within a choice has been reliably found to have 
a greater negative effect on decision quality in older vs. younger adults and older 
adults report greater aversion to increasing set size compared to younger adults 
(Mikels, Reed & Simon, 2009; Reed, Mikels & Simon, 2008) with increasing age 
being linearly and negatively correlated with choice set size preference (Reed, 
Mikels & Löckenhoff, 2013). This research is seemingly at odds with Queen et al 
(2012) in which older and younger adults both adapted decision strategies in a 
similar manner when task complexity (i.e. the number of alternatives) increased. 
There is no simple answer for the discrepant findings although some hypotheses can 
be put forward. Choosing an appropriate healthcare plan (albeit in a hypothetical, 
laboratory, environment) may be associated with some level of stress whereas the 
experimental task in Queen et al. (choosing between automobiles) is likely to invoke, 
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relatively, a much lower level of stress. Stress has been found to negatively impinge 
more upon older adults’ decision performance compared to younger adults (Cooper 
et al. 2013). Furthermore, it is worth noting that although age has been found to be a 
significant factor in determining decision-making performance in multi-attribute tasks, 
numerosity may account for greater variance in choice performance compared to 
age (Szrek & Bundorf, 2011; Tanius, Wood, Hanoch & Rice, 2009). Therefore, 
differences in numerosity between the samples in each study may account for at 
least part of the reason for the discrepancy. Further work, which may focus on 
manipulating stress and assessing decision-making performance or exploring age-
independent cognitive factors that may influence performance, is required to bridge 
these apparent discrepant findings.  
Differences in decision quality between older and younger adults in multi-
attribute tasks have been associated with shifts in the heuristics used as we age. In 
tasks designed to assess decision-making in real-world choices such as choosing 
between different healthcare or retirement plans, participants were given several 
options which differed in the number of outcomes that each alternative “covered” and 
the probability of that outcome occurring (Besedeš, Deck, Sarangi & Shor, 2012a, 
Besedeš, Deck, Sarangi & Shor, 2012b). It was not necessarily the case that the 
alternative that covered the most outcomes covered the most probable outcome. 
Younger adults tended to focus on the probabilities associated with the occurrence 
of each outcome and select an outcome that was thought to have a higher chance of 
providing a gain, denoting a level of formulaic processing. In contrast, older adults 
tended to rely on a simpler heuristic, tallying, in which the alternative chosen was the 
one that covered the greatest number of outcomes. Under 40s chose the optimal 
alternative in 52% of all choices whereas in over 60s this decreased to 32% and in 
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over 75s this decreased further to 25% (with increasing age associated with an 
increase in a reliance on tallying). This decrease in decision performance, again, 
links back to decreased cognitive (particularly executive) function underpinned by 
changes in neural structure and functioning. Therefore, in terms of real-world 
scenarios, a “less-is-more” approach may be more suitable for the older adult 
decision-maker although there are questions as to how much “less” would be the 
correct amount, as discussed in the previous paragraph. Furthermore, the question 
as to who shortlists any large choice set first will, no doubt, lead to difficult debate. 
Again, numerosity may be an important consideration (Szrek & Bundorf, 2011; 
Tanius et al., 2009). Therefore, in addition to a consideration of age, assessment of 
numerosity would also be appropriate to identify individuals at greater risk of making 
non-optimal choices as regards the individual’s own status. 
To summarise this section, there have been a number of choice domains in 
which the older adult makes a choice associated with a poorer outcome compared to 
the younger adult. The research has mostly focused on decisions under risk. Further 
work is required to identify in which exact choice scenarios negative age-related 
changes are apparent. Identifying these will pave the way for the creation of 
interventions, such as decision aids, and the integration of these into everyday life in 
order for decision quality to be improved.  
 
Differences in neural function between older and younger adults and their 
association with decision-making functioning. 
 
Research has begun to reveal telling differences between older and younger 
adults in the functioning of brain areas associated with decision-making and how 
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these changes relate to differences in observed behaviour. This research provides 
targets for future research and also for research utilising decision aids to 
compensate for negative age-related effects on decision-making as we can assess 
the effectiveness of such aids in engaging cognitive processes. This field of research 
is emerging (for reviews published at an early stage in the development of the 
research field, see Brown & Ridderinkhof, 2009; Marschner et al., 2005; and Mohr, Li 
& Heekeren, 2009) but still in its infancy and there remain a multitude of avenues of 
research that require exploration. 
Despite older adults engaging the same network of brain areas associated 
with decision-making as those reliably seen in younger adults (Elliott, Friston & 
Dolan, 2000; Labudda et al., 2008; Rogalsky et al., 2012; Robbins & Everitt, 1996), 
there are notable changes within this system that can be linked to changes in 
outward decision-making behaviour that have been reviewed earlier. Predominantly, 
the literature has explored neural activity associated with choices involving risky 
monetary rewards (typically hypothetical). As can be noted from the literature 
reviewed so far there are reliable findings regarding age-related changes in the 
quality of risky decision-making. Age-related changes in decisions involving risk have 
been found to be underpinned by functional changes to particular regions of the 
brain involved in reward processing and emotion. In choices between a certain, 
small, reward and a risky but larger reward older adults (mean age 65.2 +/- 4.2 
years) tend to favour the safer alternative compared to younger (mean age 29.9 +/- 
6.2 years) adults (Lee, Leung, Fox, Gao & Chan, 2008). In this task, consistent 
choice of any one alternative led to the same quantity of total gain. Activity with the 
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) was increasingly bilateral in older vs. younger adults. The 
OFC has been reliably associated with risky decision-making (Jollant et al., 2010), 
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notably the integration of emotion into decision-making frameworks (Wallis, 2007) 
and has been linked to risk propensity (Zhou et al., 2014). Furthermore, older adults 
expressed more activity within the right insula compared to younger adults, an area 
involved in risk processing, notably risk aversion tendencies (Kuhnen & Knutson, 
2005). On a side note, when investigating sex differences in a group of younger 
adults (around 30 years of age) females show a similar pattern of brain activity to the 
older adults and tended to make more risk aversive choices following loss-related 
feedback compared to males (Lee, Chan, Leung, Fox & Gao, 2009). Females tend to 
be risk averse compared to males (Powell & Ansic, 1997; Zhou et al., 2014) which is 
the same pattern of behaviour shown by older vs. younger adults. Given the role of 
these regions in risk aversion and decision-making, greater activation within the OFC 
and insula within these groups potentially underpins a general risk-aversive decision-
framework (Depping & Freund, 2011; Depping & Freund, 2013; Zhou et al., 2014). In 
older adults this risk-aversion has been linked to the positivity effect whereby neural 
structures involved in risk processing underlie the tendency to discount more risky 
alternatives in favour of gaining a higher probability of acquiring positive rewards, no 
matter the magnitude.  
Further to differential activity in neural regions associated with the processing 
of risk, there is neurobiological evidence showing that the process of reward and loss 
valuation is different in older vs. younger adults. Activity within the ventral striatum, a 
region associated with representation of subjective reward value (Delgado, 2007), 
shows decreased function in older (62-78 years) vs. younger (19-28 years) adults 
when anticipating probabilistic rewards (Schott et al., 2007). Furthermore, there have 
found to be age-related increases changes in temporal variability in signalling within 
the ventral striatum (Samanez-Larkin, Kuhnen, Yoo & Knutson, 2010). In other 
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words, healthy aging is associated with an increase in “noise” within ventral striatal 
signalling. This noise has been linked to findings showing age-related degradation in 
the ability to learn stimulus-outcome links (Mell et al., 2005). Age-related changes in 
ventral striatal function may be particularly pronounced when anticipating losses with 
older adults expressing significantly blunted activity within this region compared to 
younger adults (Samanez-Larkin et al., 2007). Taken as a whole, there is emerging 
evidence to suggest that the emergence of the positivity effect is due to evolving 
changes within multiple regions within the decision-making system in the brain as 
one ages. 
Reduced striatal functioning has also been linked to visible age-related 
changes in behaviour within another domain of decision-making, that of choosing 
outcomes containing delayed outcomes. Older adults typically show a greater level 
of self-control, i.e. are more likely to choose delayed, larger, rewards rather than 
using an impulsive choice strategy and selecting a smaller, immediate (or sooner), 
reward (Green, Fry & Myerson, 1994; Green, Myerson, Ostaszewski, 1999; Reimers, 
Maylor, Stewart & Chater, 2009). Only one study has explored the possible 
neurobiological basis for this age-related shift in choice dynamics. In this study, 
decreased ventral striatal activity was again found in older (65-80 years, CD) vs. 
younger (18-28 years, US) adults (Eppinger, Nystrom & Cohen, 2012). Increased 
ventral striatal activity has been associated with impulsive choice behaviour 
(Buckholtz et al., 2010; Cools, Sheridan, Jacobs & D’Esposito, 2007) thus decreased 
function within the older adults would lead to the observed increase in self-controlled 
choice, indicating that age-related changes in neurobiological function can have 
dramatically different effects within the domain of decision-making.  
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As was noted earlier, the vast majority of the literature has explored decision-
making when money is at stake. Much less attention has been directed to social 
decision-making. This review has already covered reliable findings showing that 
older adults tend to focus more on intrinsic, and personally/socially rewarding gains, 
gains as compared to younger adults who focus more on extrinsic, typically financial, 
gains. Thus, exploring social decision-making in the older adult is pertinent. A 
common experimental task used to explore social decision-making is the ultimatum 
game. In the ultimatum game a proposer is given a (typically hypothetical) small 
amount of money (e.g. $10) of which he/she is asked to share any unit value of 
which with another player called the receiver (e.g. keep $6, share $4). The receiver 
then chooses whether to accept the shared amount of money. If the offer is accepted 
both players receive the proposed share. If the receiver does not choose to accept, 
both players receive nothing. Older adults (age 55-78 years, M = 64.1 years) are 
significantly more likely to reject moderately unfair offers (i.e. share $3) than younger 
adults (18-27 years, M = 22.4 years) and have a greater expectation that offers 
should be equitable (Harlé & Sanfey, 2012), especially so in those older adults who 
report greater levels of emotional empathy (Beadle et al., 2012). When receiving 
unfair offers older adults express more activation of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
compared to younger adults. The dorsolateral prefrontal cortex plays a large role in 
executive functioning (Miller & Cohen, 2001). It was suggested that greater activity in 
this region is associated with increased engagement of computational rule usage. 
Furthermore, older adults express comparatively less activity in the anterior insula. In 
social situations, activation of the insula has been associated with violation of social 
norms by a third-party (Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom & Cohen, 2003). 
Decreased activity in this area within older adults has been attributed to the positivity 
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effect, whereby norm violation is processed to a lesser extent in older than younger 
adults (Harlé & Sanfey, 2012). This finding is potentially contrasting that of Lee et al. 
(2008) that found increased insula activity during a risky decision-making task; 
however, these two tasks are exploring different processes with one investigating 
choices between two well-defined rewards and the other exploring social interaction. 
This section has reviewed the neurobiological literature that has indicated that 
healthy aging is associated with changes in function in key parts of the decision-
making network within the brain, notably in areas involved in emotion, learning and 
representation of reward value. A significant amount of further research in this area 
is needed to fully document how healthy aging is associated with changes in 
neurobiological function and, critically, linking biological changes with behavioural 
changes. This knowledge will lead to an increased understanding of the older adult’s 
brain and how interventions may be put in place to bypass age-related negative 
changes in decision-making functioning.  
 
Conclusions 
 
Research exploring age-related changes in decision-making is sparse relative 
to that within other areas, such as memory and attention. This is surprising given the 
significant changes that occur to decision-making functioning as we age. Given the 
ongoing trend for greater life expectancy, longer working lives and increased 
expectation on older adults to manage their own lives, there is a clear need for 
greater attention being directed toward this area of research. The findings within this 
field will have significant and wide impact upon our understanding of age-related 
changes on decision-making and how individuals and society can adapt positively to 
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these changes. This review has documented several decision-making domains 
where older adults make better decisions than younger adults, notably in areas 
where older adults can employ wisdom. However, the vast majority of research has 
explored instances of age-related degradation in decision-making quality, of which 
many have been documented. This review has put forward evidence suggesting that 
the same changes in neurobiological function within the decision-making system 
underlie both positive and negative age-related changes in decision-making but the 
direction of effect (positive or negative) depends upon particular attributes of the 
choice and the choice environment. Although this review has begun to identify in 
exactly which decision scenarios age-related negative and positive (or no) changes 
would be expected, further exploration of domain-specific effects is required to 
provide a fuller account of age-related changes to decision-making functioning. 
Finally, it is worthwhile bearing in mind that negative changes may be easily 
reversible with simple interventions although the evidence remains tentative. Much 
more research is required in this area, which will have huge implications for the older 
adult in their everyday lives and, more broadly, for society as a whole. 
 
References 
 
Agarwal, S., Gabaix, X., Driscoll, J.C. & Laibson, D. (2009). The age of reason: 
Financial decisions over the life cycle and implications for regulation. Brookings 
papers on Economic activity, 40, 51-117. 
 
Bauer, A.S., Timpe, J.C., Edmonds, E.C., Bechara, A., Tranel, D. & Denburg, N.L. 
(2013). Myopia for the future or hypersensitivity to reward? Age-related 
changes in decision making on the Iowa Gambling Task. doi:10.1037/a0029970 
29 
 
 
 
 
Beadle, J.N., Paradiso, S., Kovach. C., Polgree, L., Denburg, N.L. & Tranel, D. 
(2012). Effects of age-related differences in empathy on social economic 
decision-making. International Psychogeriatrics, 24, 822-833. 
doi:10.1017/S1041610211002547 
 
Bechara, A., Damasio, A.R., Damasio, H. & Anderson, S.W. (1994). Insensitivity to 
future consequences following damage to human prefrontal cortex. Cognition, 
50, 7–15.  
 
Bellante, D. & Green, C.A. (2004). Relative risk aversion among the elderly. Review 
of Financial Economics, 13, 269-281. doi:10.1016/j.rfe.2003.09.010 
 
Besedeš, T., Deck, C., Sarangi, S. & Shor, M. (2012a). Age effects and heuristics in 
decision making. Review of Economics and Statistics, 94, 580-595. 
doi:10.1162/REST_a_00174 
 
Besedeš, T., Deck, C., Sarangi, S. & Shor, M. (2012b). Decision-making strategies 
and performance among seniors. Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization, 81, 524-533. doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2011.07.016 
 
Brand, M. & Schiebener, J. (2013). Interactions of age and cognitive functions in 
predicting decision making under risky conditions over the life span. Journal of 
Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology, 35, 9-23. 
doi:10.1080/13803395.2012.740000 
30 
 
 
 
 
Braver, T.S. and West, R. L. (2008). Working memory, executive processes, and 
aging. In Craik, F. I., and Salthouse, T.L. (Eds.), Handbook of Aging and 
Cognition, 3rd Edition (pp. 311-372). New York: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
 
Brown, S.B.R.E. & Ridderinkhof, K.R. (2009). Aging and the neuroeconomics of 
decision making: A review. Cognitive, Affective and Behavioral Neuroscience, 
9, 365-379. doi:10.3758/CABN.9.4.365 
 
Bruine de Bruin, W., Parker, A.M. & Fischoff, B. (2012). Explaining adult age 
differences in decision-making competence. Journal of Behavioral Decision 
Making, 25, 352-360. doi:10.1002/bdm.712 
 
Boyle, P.A., Lu, L., Wilson, R.S., Gamble, K., Buchman, A.S. & Bennett, D.A. (2012). 
Poor decision making is a consequence of cognitive decline among older 
persons without Alzheimer’s Disease or mild cognitive impairment. PLOS One, 
7, e43647. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0043647 
 
Braver, T.S. & Barch, D.M. (2002). A theory of cognitive control, aging condition, and 
neuromodulation. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 26, 809-817. 
doi:10.1016/S1049-7634(02)00067-2 
 
Buckholtz, J.W., Treadway, M.T., Cowan, R.L., Woodward, N.D., Li, R., Ansari, M.S., 
Baldwin, R.M…Zald, D.H. (2010). Dopaminergic network differences in human 
impulsivity. Science, 329, 532. doi:10.1126/science.1185778 
31 
 
 
 
 
Cabeza, R. (2002). Hemispheric asymmetry reduction on older adults: the HAROLD 
model. Psychology and Aging, 17, 85-100. doi:10.1037/0882-7974.17.1.85 
 
Cansino, S. (2009). Episodic memory decay along the adult lifespan: A review of 
behavioral and neurophysiological evidence. International Journal of 
Psychophysiology, 71, 64-69. doi:10.1016/j.ijpsycho.2008.07.005 
 
Carstensen, L.L. & Mikels, J.A. (2005). At the intersection of emotion and cognition: 
Aging and the positivity effect. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 14, 
117-121. doi:10.1111/j.0963-7214.2005.00348.x 
 
Castel, A. D. (2005). Memory for grocery prices in younger and older adults: The role 
of schematic support. Psychology and Aging, 20, 718–721. doi:10.1037/0882-
7974.20.4.718. 
 
Chen, Y. & Ma, X. (2009). Age differences in risky decisions: the role of anticipated 
emotions. Educational Gerontology, 35, 575-586. 
doi:10.1080/03601270802605291 
 
Cools, R., Sheridan, M., Jacobs, E. & D’Esposito, M. (2007). Impulsive personality 
predicts dopamine-dependent changes in frontostriatal activity during 
component processes of working memory. The Journal of Neuroscience, 27, 
5506-5514. doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0601-07.2007 
 
32 
 
 
 
Cooper, J.A., Worthy, D.A., Gorlick, M.A. & Maddox, W.T. (2013). Scaffolding across 
the lifespan in history-dependent decision-making. Psychology and Aging, 28, 
505-514. doi:10.1037/a0032717 
 
Delgado, M.R. (2007). Reward-related responses in the human striatum. Annals of 
the New York Academy of Sciences, 1104, 70-88. doi:10.1196/annals.1390.002 
 
Delgado, M.R., Li, J., Schiller, D. & Phelps, E.A. (2008). The role of the striatum in 
aversive learning and aversive prediction errors. Philosophical Transactions of 
the Royal Society B, 363, 3787-3800. doi:10.1098/rstb.2008.0161 
 
Dempster, F. (1992). The rise and fall of the inhibitory mechanism: toward a unified 
theory of cognitive development and aging. Developmental Review, 12, 45-75. 
 
Denburg, N.L., Tranel, D. & Bechara, A. (2005). The ability to decide advantageously 
declines prematurely in some normal older persons. Neuropsychologia, 43, 
1099-1106. doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2004.09.012 
 
Denburg, N.L., Weller, J.A., Yamada, T.H., Shivapour, D.M., Kaup, A.R., LaLoggia, 
A…Bechara, A. (2009). Poor decision making among older adults is related to 
elevated levels of neuroticism. Annals of Behavioral Medicine, 37, 164-172. 
doi:10.1007/s12160-009-9094-7 
 
Depping, M.K & Freund, A.M. (2011). Normal aging and decision-making: The role of 
motivation. Human Development, 54, 349-367. doi:10.1159/000334396 
33 
 
 
 
 
Depping, M.K & Freund, A.M. (2013). When choice matters: Task-dependent 
memory effects on older adulthood. Psychology and Aging, 28, 923-936. 
doi:10.1037/a0034520 
 
Dror, I.E., Katona, M. & Mungur, K. (1998). Age differences in decision making: To 
take a risk or not? Gerontology, 44, 67-71.  
 
Elliott, R., Friston, K.J. & Dolan, R.J. (2000). Dissociable neural responses in human 
reward systems. The Journal of Neuroscience, 20, 6159-6165.  
 
Eppinger, B., Nystrom, L.E. & Cohen, J.D. (2012). Reduced sensitivity to immediate 
reward during decision-making in older than younger adults. PloS ONE, 7, 
e36953. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036953 
 
Evans, J.S.B.T. (2008). Dual-processing accounts of reasoning, judgment and social 
cognition. Annual Review of Psychology, 59, 255-278. 
doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093629 
 
Fein, G., McGillivray, S. & Finn, P. (2007). Older adults make less advantageous 
decisions than younger adults: Cognitive and psychological correlates. Journal 
of the International Neuropsychological Society, 13, 480-489. 
 
34 
 
 
 
Finucane, M.L. & Guillon, C.M. (2010). Developing a tool for measuring the decision-
making competence of older adults. Psychology and Aging, 25, 271-288. 
doi:10.1037/a0019106 
 
Finucane, M.L., Slovic, P., Hibbard, J.H., Peters, E., Mertz, C.K. & MacGregor, D.G. 
(2002). Aging and decision-making competence: An analysis of comprehension 
and consistency skills in older versus younger adults considering health-plan 
options. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 15, 141-164. 
doi:10.1002/bdm.407 
 
Fiorillo, C.D., Tobler, P.N. & Schultz, W. (2003). Discrete coding of reward probability 
and uncertainty by dopamine neurons. Science, 299, 1898-1902. 
doi:10.1126/science.1077349 
 
Frank, M. J., & Kong, L. (2008). Learning to avoid in older age. Psychology and 
Aging, 23, 392–398. doi:10.1037/0882-7974.23.2.392 
 
Good, C.D., Johnsrude, I.S., Ashburner, J., Henson, R.N., Fristin, K.J. & Frackowiak, 
R.S. (2001). A voxel-based morphometric study of ageing in 465 normal adult 
human brains. NeuroImage, 14, 21-36. doi:10.1006/nimg.2001.0786 
 
Green, L., Fry, A.F. & Myerson, J. (1994). Discounting of delayed rewards: A life-
span comparison. Psychological Science, 5, 33-36. doi:10.1111/j.1467-
9280.1994.tb00610.x 
 
35 
 
 
 
Green, L., Myerson, J. & Ostaszewski, P. (1999). Discounting of delayed rewards 
across the life span: age differences in individual discounting functions. 
Behavioural Processes, 46, 89-96.  
 
Harlé, K.M. & Sanfey, A.G. (2012). Social economic decision-making across the 
lifespan: An fMRI investigation. Neuropsychologia, 50, 1416-1424. 
doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2012.02.026 
 
Isella, V., Mapelli, C., Moriella, N., Pelati, O., Franceschi, M. & Appolonio, I.M. 
(2008). Age-related quantitative and qualitative changes in decision-making 
ability. Behavioural Neurology, 19, 59-63.  
 
Kasten, G.W. & Kasten, M.W. (2011). The impact of aging on retirement income 
decision making. Journal of Financial Planning, 24, 60-69.  
 
Lamar, M. & Resnick, S.M. (2004). Aging and prefrontal functions: dissociating 
orbitofrontal and dorsolateral abilities. Neurobiology of Aging, 25, 553-558. 
doi:10.1016.j.neurobiolaging.2003.06.005 
 
Li, Y., Baldassi, M., Johnson, E. & Weber, E.U. (2013). Complementary cognitive 
capabilities, economic decision making and aging. Psychology and Aging, 28, 
595-613. doi:10.1037/a0034172 
 
36 
 
 
 
Li, S.C., Lindenberger, U. & Silkström, S. (2001). Aging cognition: from 
neuromodulation to representation. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 5, 479-486. 
doi:10.1016/S1364-6613(00)01769-1 
 
Löckenhoff, C.E. (2011). Age, time, and decision making: from processing speed to 
global time horizons. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1235, 44-
56. doi:10.111/j.1749-6632.2011.06209.x 
 
Löckenhoff, C.E. & Carstensen, L.L. (2007). Aging, emotion and health-related 
decision strategies: Motivational manipulations can reduce age differences. 
Psychology and Aging, 22, 134-146. doi:10.1037/0882-7974.22.1.134 
 
Hanoch, Y., Wood, S., Barnes, A., Liu, P-J. & Rice, T. (2011). Choosing the right 
medicare prescription drug plan: The effect of age, strategy selection, and 
choice set size. Health Psychology, 30, 719-727. doi:10.1037/a0023951 
 
Hanoch, Y., Wood, S. & Rice, T. (2007). Bounded rationality, emotions and older 
decision making: Not so fast and yet so frugal. Human Development, 50, 333-
358. doi:10.1159/000109835 
 
Henninger, D.E., Madden, D.J. & Huettel., S.A. (2010). Processing speed and 
memory mediate age-related differences in decision-making. Psychology and 
Aging, 25, 262-270. doi:10.1037/a0019096 
 
37 
 
 
 
Hess, T.M., Queen, T.L. & Ennis, G.E. (2013). Age and self-relevance effects on 
information search during decision making. Journals of Gerontology – Series B 
Psychological Sciences and Social Sciences, 68, 703-711. 
doi:10.1093/geronb/gbs108 
 
Hess, T.M., Queen, T.L. & Patterson, T.R. (2012). To deliberate or not to deliberate: 
Interactions between age, task characteristics, and cognitive activity on 
decision-making. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 25, 29-40. 
doi:10.1002/bdm.711 
 
Huang, Y., Wood, S., Berger, D. & Hanoch, Y. (2013). Risky choice in younger 
versus older adults: Affective context matters. Judgment and Decision Making, 
8, 179-187.  
 
Johnson, M.M.S. (1990). Age differences in decision making: A process 
methodology for examining strategic information processing. Journal of 
Gerontology: Psychological Sciences, 45, 75–78.  
 
Jollant, F., Lawrence, N.S., Olie, E., O’Daly, O., Malafosse, A., Courtet, P. & Phillips, 
M.L. (2010). Decreased activation of lateral orbitofrontal cortex during risky 
choices under uncertainty is associated with disadvantageous decision-making 
and suicidal behaviour. Neuroimage, 51, 1275-1281. 
doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2010.03.027 
 
38 
 
 
 
Kaiser Family Foundation (2014). Medicare Part D: A first look at plan offerings in 
2014. Retrieved from the Kaiser Family Foundation website: 
http://kff.org/medicare/issue-brief/medicare-part-d-a-first-look-at-plan-offerings-
in-2014 
 
Kim, S. & Hasher, L. (2005). The attraction effect in decision making: Superior 
performance by older adults. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 58A, 120-133. doi:10.1080/02724980443000160 
 
Korniotis, G.M. & Kumar, A. (2009). Do older investors make better investment 
decisions? Review of Economics and Statistics, 93, 244-265. 
 
Kuhnen, C.M. & Knutson, B. (2005). The neural basis of financial risk taking. Neuron, 
47, 763-770. doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2005.08.008 
 
Labudda, K., Woermann, F.G., Mertens, M., Pohlmann-Eden, B., Markowitsch, H.J. 
& Brand, M. (2008). Neural correlates of decision making with explicit 
information about probabilities and incentives in elderly healthy subjects. 
Experimental brain Research, 187, 641-650. doi:10.1007/s00221-008-1332-x 
 
Lee, T.M.C., Chan, C.C.H., Leung, A.W.S., Fox, P.T. & Gao, J-H. (2008). Sex-
related differences in neural activity during risk taking: An fMRI study. Cerebral 
Cortex, 19, 1303-1312. doi:10.1093/cercor/bhn172 
 
39 
 
 
 
Lee, T.M.C., Leung, A.W.S., Fox, P.T., Gao, J-H. & Chan, C.C.H. (2008). Age-
related differences in neural activities during risk taking as revealed by 
functional MRI. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 3, 7-15. 
doi:10.1093/scan/nsm033 
 
Löckenhoff, C.E. (2011). Age, time, and decision making: from processing speed to 
global time horizons. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1235, 44-
56. doi:10.111/j.1749-6632.2011.06209.x 
 
MacPherson, S.E., Phillips, L.H. & Della Salla, S. (2002). Age, executive function, 
and social decision making: A dorsolateral prefrontal theory of cognitive aging. 
Psychology and Aging, 17, 598-609. doi:10.1037//0882-7974.17.4.598 
 
Marschner, A., Mell, T., Wartenburger, I., Villringer, A., Reischies, F.M. & heekeren, 
H.R. (2005). Reward-based decision-making and aging. Brain Research 
Bulletin, 67, 382-390. doi:10.1016/j.brainresbull.2005.06.010 
 
Mata, R., Josef, A.K., Samanez-Larkin, G.R. & Hertwig, R. (2011). Age differecnes in 
risky choice: a meta-analysis. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 
1235, 18-29. doi:10.111/j.1749-6632.2011.06200.x 
 
Mata, R. & Nunes, L. (2010). When less is enough: Cognitive aging, information 
search, and decision quality in consumer choice. Psychology and Aging, 25, 
289-298. doi:10.1037/a0017927 
 
40 
 
 
 
Mata, R., Schooler, L.J. & Rieskamp, J. (2007). The aging decision maker: Cognitive 
aging and the adaptive selection of decision strategies. Psychology and Aging, 
22, 796-810. doi:10.1037/0882-7974.22.4.796 
 
Mather, M., Mazar, N., Gorlick, M.A., Lighthall, N.R., Burgeno, J. & Schoeke, A. 
(2012). Risk preferences and aging: The “certainty effect” in older adults’ 
decision making. Psychology and Aging, 27, 801-816. doi:10.1037/a0030174 
 
McClure, S.M., Daw, N.D. & Montague, P.R. (2003). A computational substrate for 
incentive salience. Trends in Neurosciences, 26, 423-428. doi:10.1016/S0166-
2236(03)00177-2 
 
Mell, T., Heekeren, H.R., Marschner, A., Wartenburger, I., Villringer, A. & Reischies, 
F.M. (2005). Effect of aging on stimulus-reward association learning. 
Neuropsychologia, 43, 554-563. doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2004.07.010 
 
Mikels, J.A., Cheung, E., Cone, J. & Gilovich, T. (2013). The dark side of intuition: 
Aging and increases in nonoptimal intuitive decisions. Emotion, 13, 189-195. 
doi:10.1037/a0030441 
 
Mikels, J.A., Reed, A.E. & Simon, K.I. (2009). Older adults place lower value on 
choice relative to young adults. Journals of Gerontology – Series B 
Psychological Sciences and Social Sciences, 64, 443-6. 
doi:10.1093/geronb/gbp021 
 
41 
 
 
 
Miller, E.K. & Cohen, J.D. An integrative theory of prefrontal cortex function. Annual 
Review of Neuroscience, 24, 167-202.  
 
Mohr, P.N.C., Li, S-C. & Heekeren, H.R. (2010). Neuroeconomics and aging: 
Neuromodulation of economic decision making in old age. Neuroscience and 
Biobehavioral Reviews, 34, 678-688. doi:10.1016/j.neurobiorev.2009.05.010 
 
Myerson, J., Robertson, S. & Hale, S. (2007). Aging and intraindividual variability in 
performance: analysis of response time distributions. Journal of the 
Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 88, 319-337. doi:10.1901/jeab.2007.88-319 
 
Nyberg, L., Lövden, M., Riklund, K., Lindenberger, U & Bäckman, L. (2012). Memory 
aging and brain maintenance. Trends on Cognitive Sciences, 16, 292-305. 
doi:10.1016/j.tics.2012.04.005 
 
Park, D.C., Lautenschlager, G., Hedden, T., Davidson, N.S., Smith, A.D. & Smith, 
P.K. Models of visuospatial and verbal memory across the adult life span. 
Psychology and Aging, 17, 299-320. doi:10.1037/0882-7974.17.2.299 
 
Powell, M. & Ansic, D. (1997). Gender differences in risk behaviour in financial 
decision-making: An experimental analysis. Journal of Economic Psychology, 
18, 605-628. 
 
42 
 
 
 
Queen, T.L. & Hess, T.M. (2010). Age differences in the effects of conscious and 
unconscious thought in decision making. Psychology and Aging, 25, 251-261. 
doi:10.1037/a0018856 
 
Queen, T.L., Hess, T.M., Ennis, G.E., Dowd, K. & Grühn. (2012). Information search 
and decision making: Effects of age and complexity on strategy use. 
Psychology and Aging, 27, 817-824. doi:10.1037/a0028744 
 
Raz, N., Lindenberger, U., Rodrigue, K.M., Kennedy, K.M., Head, D., Williamson, 
A…Acker, J.D. (2005). Regional brain changes in aging healthy adults: general 
trends, individual differences and modifiers. Cerebral Cortex, 15, 1676-89. 
doi:10.1093/cercor/bhi044 
 
Reed, A.E., Mikels, J.A. & Löckenhoff, C.E. (2013). Preferences for choice across 
adulthood: Age trajectories and potential mechanisms. Psychology and Aging, 
28, 625-632. doi:10.1037/a0031399 
 
Reed, A.E., Mikels, J.A. & Simon, K.I. (2008). Older adults prefer less choice than 
young adults. Psychology and Aging, 23, 671-675. doi:10.1037/a0012772 
 
Reimers, S., Maylor, E.A., Stewart, N. & Chater, N. (2009). Associations between a 
one-shot discounting measure and age, income, education and real-world 
impulsive behaviour. Personality and Individual Differences, 47, 973-978. 
doi:10.1016/j.paid.2009.07.026 
 
43 
 
 
 
Resnick, S.M., Pham, D.L., Kraut, M.A., Zonderman, A.B. & Davatzikos, C. (2003). 
Longitudinal magnetic resonance imaging studies of older adults: A shrinking 
brain. The Journal of Neuroscience, 23, 3295-3301.  
 
Richards, M. & Hatch, S. (2011). Good news about the ageing brain. British Medical 
Journal, 343, d6288. doi:10.1136/bmj.d6288 
 
Robbins, T.W. & Everitt, B.J. (1996). Neurobehavioural mechanisms of reward and 
motivation. Current Biology, 6, 228-236.  
 
Rogalsky, C., Vidal, C., Li, X. & Damasio, H. (2012). Risky decision-making in older 
adults without cognitive deficits: An fMRI study of VMPFC using the Iowa 
Gambling Task. Social Neuroscience, 7, 178-190. 
doi:10.1080/17470919.2011.588340 
 
Salthouse, T.A. (1996). The processing-speed theory of adult age differences in 
cognition. Psychological Review, 103, 403-428. doi:10.1037/0033-
295X.103.3.403 
 
Samanez-Larkin, G.R., Gibbs, S.E.B., Khanna, K., Nielsen, L., Carstensen, L.L. & 
Knutson, B. (2007). Anticipation of monetary gain but not loss in healthy older 
adults. Nature Neuroscience, 10, 787-791. doi:10.1038/nn1894  
 
Samanez-Larkin, G.R., Kuhnen, C.M., Yoo, D.J. & Knutson, B. (2010). Variability in 
nucleus accumbens activity mediates age-related suboptimal financial risk 
44 
 
 
 
taking. Journal of Neuroscience, 30, 1426-1434. 
doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.4902-09.2010 
 
Sanfey, A.G., Rilling, J.K., Aronson, J.A., Nystrom, L.E. & Cohen, J.D. (2003). The 
neural basis of economic decision-making in the ultimatum game. Science, 
300, 1755-1758.  
 
Schott, B.H., Niehaus, L., Wittman, B.C., Schütze, Seidenbecher, C.I., Heinze, H-J. 
& Düzel, E. (2007). Ageing and early-stage Parkinson’s disease affect 
separable neural mechanisms of mesolimbic reward processing. Brain, 130, 
2412-2424. doi:10.1093/brain/awm147 
 
Spaniol, J. & Wegier, P. (2012). Decisions from experience: adaptive information 
search and choice in younger and older adults. Frontiers in Neuroscience, 6, 
36. doi:10.3389/fnins.2012.00036 
 
Sternthal, B. & Bonezzi, A. (2009). Consumer decision making and aging: A 
commentary. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 19, 23-27. 
doi:10.1016.j.jcps.2008.12.004 
 
Strough, J., Karns, T.E. & Schosnagle, L. (2011). Decision-making heuristics and 
biases across the lifespan. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 
1235, 57-74. doi:10.1111/j.1749-6632.2011.06208.x 
 
45 
 
 
 
Strough, J., Mehta, C.M., McFall, J.P. & Schuller, K.L. (2008). Are older adults less 
subject to the sunk-cost fallacy than younger adults? Psychological Science, 
19, 650-652. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02138.x 
 
Strough, J. Scholsnagle, L. & Didonato, L. (2011). Understanding decisions about 
sunk costs from older and younger adults’ perspectives. Journals of 
Gerontology – Series B Psychological Sciences and Social Sciences, 66B, 681-
686. doi:10.1093/geronb/gbr057 
 
Szrek, H. & Bundorf, M.K. (2011). Age and the purchase of prescription drug 
insurance by older adults. Psychology and Aging, 26, 308-320. 
doi:10.1037/a0023169 
 
Tanius, B.E., Wood, S. Hanoch, Y. & Rice, T. (2009). Aging and choice: Applications 
to Medicare Part D. Judgment and Decision Making, 4, 92-101.  
 
Tentori, K., Osherson, D., Hasher, L. & May, C. (2001). Wisdom and aging: irrational 
preferences in college students but not older adults. Cognition, 81, B87-B96. 
 
Thomas, A.K. & Millar, P.R. (2012). Reducing the framing effect bias in older adults 
by encouraging analytical processing. Journal of Gerontology: Series B: 
Psychological Sciences and Social Sciences, 67B, 139-149. 
doi:10.1093/geronb/gbr076 
 
46 
 
 
 
United Nations Population Division. (2002). World Population Ageing 1950-2050. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/worldageing19502050 
 
Wallis, J.D. (2007). Orbitofrontal cortex and its contribution to decision-making. 
Annual Review of Neuroscience, 30, 31-56. 
doi:10.1146/annurev.neuro.30.051606.094334 
 
Weierich, M.R., Kensinger, E.A., Munnell, A.H., Sass, S.A., Dickerson, B.C., Wright, 
C.I. & Barrett, L.F. (2011). Older and wiser? An affective science perspective 
on age-related challenges in financial decision making. Social Cognitive and 
Affective Neuroscience, 6, 195-206. doi:10.1093/scan/nsq056 
 
Weller, J.A., Levin, I.P. & Denburg, N.L. (2011). Trajectory of risky decision making 
for potential gains and losses from ages 5 to 85. Journal of Behavioral Decision 
Making, 24, 331-344. doi:10.1002/bdm.690 
 
West, R.L. (1996). An application of prefrontal cortex function theory to cognitive 
aging. Psychological Bulletin, 120, 272-292. 
 
Westbrook, A., Martins, B.S., Yarkoni, T. & Braver, T.S. (2012). Strategic insight and 
age-related goal-neglect influence risky decision-making. Frontiers in 
Neuroscience, 6, 68. doi:10.3389/fnins.2012.00068 
 
47 
 
 
 
Wood, S., Busemeyer, J., Koling, A., Cox, C.R. & Davis, H. (2005). Older adults as 
adaptive decision makers: Evidence from the Iowa Gambling Task. Psychology 
and Aging, 20, 220-225. doi:10.1037/0882-7974.20.2.220 
 
Wood, S., Hanoch, Y., Barnes, A., Liu, P-J., Cummings, J., Bhattacharya, C. & Rice, 
T. (2011). Numeracy and Medicare Part D: The important and choice and 
literacy for numbers in optimizing decision making for Medicare’s prescription 
drug program. Psychology and Aging, 26, 295-307. doi:10.1037/a0022028 
 
Worthy, D.A., Gorlick, M.A., Pacheco, J.L., Schnyer, D.M. & Maddox, W.T. (2011). 
With age comes wisdom: Decision-making in younger and older adults. 
Psychological Science, 22, 1375-1380. doi:10.1177/0956797611420301 
 
Worthy, D.A. & Maddox, W.T. (2012). Age-based differences in strategy use on 
choice tasks. Frontiers in Neuroscience, 5, 145. doi:10.3389/fnins.2011.00145 
 
Zamarian, L., Sinz, H. Bonatti, E., Gamboz, N. & Delazer, M. (2008). Normal aging 
affects decisions under ambiguity, but not decisions under risk. 
Neuropsychology, 22, 645-657. doi:10.1037/0894-4105.22.5.645 
 
Zhou, Y., Li, S., Dunn, J., Li, H., Qin, W., Zhu, M., Rao, L-L…Jiang, T. (2014). The 
neural correlates of risk propensity in males and females using resting-state 
fMRI. Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience, 8. doi:10.3389/fnbeh.2014.00002 
 
 
